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According to Kant, freedom is a “kind of causality” (A445/B473).2 It is the capacity 
to initiate causal chains of itself without prior grounds, independently of nature’s 
causal laws. Freedom is causality through concepts, determined by reason’s moral 
law. (A547f/B575f.) According to Kant, freedom and nature can coexist, for in 
transcendental idealism freedom pertains to things in themselves and natural causality 
only to appearances. The same action can be “intelligible […] as a thing in itself” yet 
“sensible […] as an appearance” (A538/B566). Although theoretical reason can only 
prove the logical possibility of freedom, we can cognise its actuality practically: we 
are conscious of our capacity for self-legislation via the moral law, hence of a free 
power of choice that determines our actions independently of (but not in conflict with) 
the deterministic mechanism of nature. It is this latter claim that “constitutes the real 
moment of the difficulties” (A533/B561) in Kant’s practical conception of freedom. 
 
I will not here question Kant’s reconciliation of freedom and nature: I grant him that 
we are denizens of two worlds, phenomena subject to deterministic nature and 
noumena capable of free self-legislation, and that if I am morally obligated, I must be 
free. But even granting this, since the categories of the understanding – including 
causality – can be objectively applied only to appearances, never to supersensible 
things in themselves, and freedom is supersensible, the question remains: In what 
sense can we call freedom causality without thereby applying the categories 
transcendentally to supersensible things – an application Kant explicitly, consistently, 
and empathetically rejects in all three Critiques. I submit that only Kant’s theory of 
symbolic cognition can avoid this contradiction and that symbolism is thus an 
indispensable part of his philosophical system – indeed, it is a necessary condition of 
the possibility of our very agency itself. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Forthcoming in: Akten des 12. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses “Natur und Freiheit” in Wien vom 
21.–25. September 2015. Hg. v. Violetta L. Waibel und Margit Ruffing. Berlin (voraussichtlich 2018).  
2 Translations of Kant’s works are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. 
Deviations from these translations are marked with “tr. modified” or “tr. amended.” 
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PURE	  CATEGORIES	  
 
It might be tempting to try to solve this problem by relying on “unschematised” or 
pure categories – that since it is schemata that restrict categories to appearances, one 
could apply the category of cause without its schema to freedom.3 Here freedom is 
causality, albeit without the schema we cannot theoretically cognise it. Although I 
will not specifically argue against it, I reject this view as contrary to the letter and 
spirit of Kant’s philosophy, for reasons that will become clear during the paper: 
symbolic cognition is not and cannot be unschematised. The idea of an 
“unschematised” category prompts an important question, however: What are 
categories without schemata? Indeed, what are categories? 
 
Kant defines categories as “concepts of an object in general, by means of which its 
intuition is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions for 
judgments” (B128). These are the logical functions exhibited in the Table of 
Judgments, from which the Table of Categories is derived. Side-stepping here the 
numerous complications, the categories are thus these logical functions when they are 
applied to intuition, i.e. objectively to things, not just logically to thoughts. 
(A79/B104f, B143.) 
 
Whereas the Table of Judgments expounds the functions of all thinking in general, 
the Table of Categories represents the functions of thinking of objects, which, in turn, 
requires synthesis of intuition. Schemata are exactly what connects categories to 
intuitions and so “makes possible the application of [categories] to [appearances]” 
(A138/B177), thereby “providing them with a relation to objects, thus with 
significance” (A146/B185). As Kant notes, it might seem that without the restrictive 
schemata the “pure” categories “hold for things […] as they are, [not just] how they 
appear” (A147/B186). But since schemata facilitate the objective application of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 E.g. Adams, Robert M.: Things in Themselves. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57/4 
(1997), 801–825, 820f. Allais, Lucy: Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics. Kant’s Commitment to 
Things As They Are in Themselves. In: Kant-Yearbook 2 (2010), 1–32, 16. Ameriks, Karl: Kant’s 
Theory of Mind. Oxford 2000, xxiv, 67, 290. Hogan, Desmond: Noumenal Affection. In: Philosophical 
Review 118/4 (2009), 501–532, 504. Watkins, Eric: Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge 
2005, 190n8, 324. Westphal, Kenneth R.: Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge 2004, 
43, 51. 
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categories in the first place, abstracting from them abstracts from all objective 
significance. Indeed, “without schemata” the categories just revert back to the 
“functions of the understanding for concepts”, to which the schemata were added, and 
thus “do not represent any object” (A147/B187). Hence Kant grants the pure 
categories only “logical significance of the mere unity of representations” 
(A147/B186). 
 
A hypothetical judgment expresses a logical function of dependency between 
judgments: an “if… then…” structure. This dependency-function can also be applied 
to concepts, giving rise to the pure concepts of ground and consequence – the logical 
counterparts of cause and effect. I.e. when the latter are deprived of schemata, they 
mean “merely the logical functions of […] ground and consequence” (B431). 
Accordingly, “the word cause, when used of the supersensible, signifies only the 
ground” (KU, AA 05: 195; cf. A564/B593). To furnish this logical ground with a 
schema is (for humans) to determine it as a real spatiotemporal ground of existence – 
as a cause. Without schemata, a ground is just something taking the logical place of 
the “if” in “if… then…” E.g. a premise grounds (the truth of) a conclusion, but, as 
non-spatiotemporal, cannot be said to cause it. Thus the unschematised category of 
cause – a mere logical ground – does not suffice for freedom, for freedom needs more 
than logical significance: its effects are actions that appear and exist in 
spatiotemporal nature. 
 
FREEDOM	  AND	  NATURE	  
 
It is this last point that sets nature and freedom on a collision course. Although free 
grounds themselves are not temporal, actions as their consequences are temporal 
events in nature and hence subject to its deterministic mechanism. (A536–8/B564–6, 
A543f/B571f; KU, AA 05: 196, 474f.) Thus the effects of freedom are at the same 
time effects of nature and “all the actions” – even free ones – “of the human being in 
appearance are determined in accordance with the order of nature” (A549f/B577f). 
The same action as a natural phenomenon is sufficiently grounded in preceding 
events, yet as a supernatural noumenon it can be grounded on an atemporal, free 
choice (A536–43/B564–71, A554–5/B582–3). 
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To alleviate this paradox, note that in a sense an event can have multiple causes. The 
proximate cause of someone’s death may be heart failure, but one can identify others: 
a bullet striking the heart, a decision to pull the trigger, the psychological make-up of 
the shooter, etc. In a way the whole chain of events is the cause, and it is somewhat 
arbitrary what we single out as the ‘true’ cause. We could even say that the Big Bang 
is the cause of death – or speculate that it, too, is further grounded in God’s act of 
creation. In one sense none of the events in the series caused the death, yet in another 
sense all of them did by contributing to its full explanation. Indeed, according to 
Kant, reason’s causality is that “through which the sensible condition of an empirical 
series of effects first begins” (A552/B580) and this “empirical causality itself […] 
could […] be an effect of a causality that is not empirical, but rather intelligible” 
(A544/B572). Thus, although every action is determined by a series of natural causes, 
if freedom is “the ground […] of the possibility of [this] sensible series” (A564/B598) 
itself, there is no contradiction in both the sensible and the supersensible grounding 
actions. 
 
Kant attributes choice to our intelligible character – contrasted with our empirical 
character. (A539–41/B567–69, A546–57/B574–85; KpV, AA 05: 97–100.) The 
former is noumenal and timeless and determines the latter’s actions as appearances. 
Whereas the actions of the empirical character “appear in alterable shapes” 
(A549/B577), the intelligible character is unalterable: “The causality of reason in the 
intelligible character does not arise or start working at a certain time in producing an 
effect” (A551/B579). It is as if my life were a film that unfolds in time – a “sequence 
of [my] existence as a sensible being” (KpV, AA 05: 97f) – while the film itself exists 
apart from its representation in temporal sequence. Although freely grounded, actions 
as appearances are describable and even predictable by laws of nature. 
 
Yet, if you know today that I will lie tomorrow, how can I be free to choose? The lie 
as an act of my empirical character appears in a moment, but the free choice of my 
noumenal character that grounds the appearance of me lying tomorrow does not – and 
so “in the moment when [a person] lies, it is entirely his fault” (A555/B583). The 
actions we experience are not free: they are temporal effects of timeless free choices – 
appearances grounded in things in themselves (A537/B565). We call them free only 
	   5	  
because their ground is free. For Kant, freedom is lawful and autonomous self-
legislation – and in no way does the predictability of autonomy violate its freedom: 
 
One can therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a human 
being’s cast of mind […], we could calculate a human being’s conduct for the future with as 
much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and would nevertheless maintain that the human 
being’s conduct is free. (KpV, AA 05: 99.) 
 
Neither Kant’s nor my aim is to speculate about the metaphysics of freedom 
(A557/B585). The import thus far is that there is a logically coherent way to reconcile 
freedom and nature through transcendental idealism, and “if we would give in to the 
deception of transcendental realism, then neither nature nor freedom would be left” 
(A543/B571). But ultimately this is just to say that appearances are not self-sufficient 
but grounded on things in themselves. Thus the problem of how atemporal choices 
can ground temporal actions is in fact the same as the general problem of how things 
in themselves can ground appearances – not an additional one. And crucially, as Kant 
remarks, we do not even know how natural causes produce events – how substances 
interact – just that they must do so (A448/B476). Thus he does not wish to speculate 
how free will might produce actions but to show that if there is morality, our will must 
be able to do so. Freedom is, then, both “an inscrutable faculty” (KpV, AA 05: 47) 
and “the only […idea] of pure reason whose object is a fact” (KU, AA 05: 468). 
 
It is this question of the very possibility of morality that transforms the idle and 
playful metaphysical speculation into a profound riddle of human existence. Were it 
not for morality, we could rest content with the mere logical compatibility of freedom 
and nature – with the logical possibility of freedom. But, as I will explicate shortly, 
moral agency needs not only freedom but also the capacity to be conscious of 
freedom: if we could not cognise our freedom, we could not be conscious of our 
capacity to act and to influence our behaviour, and hence, ultimately, could not act 
and take moral responsibility for our actions at all – for ought implies can. And, as I 
will show, symbolic cognition is a necessary for this possibility to act morally from 
freedom, albeit neither for freedom nor for morality themselves. 
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FREEDOM	  AS	  ANALOGOUS	  TO	  CAUSALITY	  
 
All objective reality – even practical objective reality of freedom – requires intuition 
(e.g. FM, AA 20: 279f). Hence the dilemma: since the categories apply to objects 
only via intuition, and free grounds cannot be intuited, either Kant would have to 
violate this limitation or freedom could only be an empty logical construct, the 
objective reality of which neither our theoretical nor practical reason could cognise. 
Both horns are unacceptable for Kant: freedom must have practical objective reality, 
and this fact has to respect the boundaries of the categories. Thus there must be a third 
way to represent freedom, one that has more than logical significance yet falls short of 
theoretical cognition proper. This third way is to apply the categories analogously via 
symbols (KU, AA 05: 351–3; FM, AA 20: 279f).4 
 
There are two ways to present (darstellen) an object of a concept – to “mak[e] 
something sensible” (KU, AA 05: 351). Schematic presentation is direct and 
demonstrative, symbolic presentation only indirect and analogical. Both confer 
objective reality to concepts: 
 
If objective reality is accorded to the concept directly (directe) through the intuition that 
corresponds to it […], this act is called schematism; but if it cannot be presented immediately, 
but only in its consequences (indirecte), it may be called the symbolization of the concept. 
The first occurs with concepts of the sensible, the second is expedient for concepts of the 
super-sensible […]. (FM, AA 20: 279.) 
 
In symbolic presentation “it is merely the rule of [the procedure of schematization], 
not the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, 
which corresponds to the concept” (KU, AA 05: 351, tr. amended). Symbols 
“transport[] […] the reflection on one object of intuition to another, quite different 
concept” (KU, AA 05: 352f). Symbolic presentation does not determine objects but 
only reflects on them, producing thereby mere indirect “cognition by analogy” (FM, 
AA 20: 280, tr. modified). If I say e.g. that evil moves like a serpent, I do not 
determine evil directly through the intuition of a moving serpent, for evil – as abstract 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Cf. Chignell, Andrew: Are Supersensibles Really Possible? Kant on the Evidential Role of 
Symbolization. In: V. Rhoden et al. (eds.): Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Berlin 2009, 
99–109. 
	   7	  
and intelligible – does not move at all. Rather, I apply my reflection on this intuition 
to evil, whereby I present evil to myself as evasive and deceitful like a serpent. 
 
Symbolic cognition does not contradict the view that pure categories lack objective 
significance. For “the symbolic is merely a species of the intuitive”, and in it 
“empirical intuitions are also employed” (KU, AA 05: 351f). Symbolic presentation 
“performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of sensible intuition, 
and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely 
different object, of which the first is only the symbol” (KU, AA 05: 352). Symbolic 
presentation is not unschematised but on the contrary rests on schematisation: we first 
present an object schematically and only then use it as a symbol for something that 
cannot be presented schematically: “even though no corresponding intuition can be 
put under the rational concept of freedom […], nevertheless a sensible intuition must 
first be given for the concept of the understanding (of causality)” (KpV, AA 05: 
103f). 
 
Since unschematised categories have not undergone schematisation, they have only 
logical significance as empty thoughts. Symbolic presentation has undergone 
schematisation, yet it is only indirectly grounded on a schema and not direct 
presentation through it. Unlike commonly thought, the distinction between schematic 
and symbolic presentation is thus not one between schematised and unschematised 
categories but a further division of the schematised: whether an intuition is presented 
as a direct correspondent of a concept or as a mere indirect analogue to it. 
 
Kant employs the concept of analogy in various ways.5 A central distinction is 
between mathematical and philosophical analogy. The former is quantitative and 
constitutive, the latter qualitative and regulative. In mathematics, by knowing the 
lengths of the sides a, b, and c of two figures and the identity of the ratios a:b and c:d, 
one can cognise the length of d (Prol, AA 04: 357n). Here d is fully determined 
because it is of the same kind as a, b, and c: their difference is only quantitative. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Callanan, John: Kant on Analogy. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16/4 (2008), 
747–772. 
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Philosophical analogy is, however, “a perfect similarity between two relations in 
wholly dissimilar things” (Prol, AA 04: 357), where from “the identity […] of two 
qualitative relations [… and] three given members I can cognize and give a priori 
only the relation to a fourth member but not this fourth member itself” (A179/B222). 
Accordingly, I know actions as well as natural causes and effects, and by analogy I 
can present the unknown member freedom so that it is to action as cause is to effect. 
Yet, since natural causes as phenomena are “wholly dissimilar” to free noumenal 
grounds, I do not hereby cognise freedom itself – only how it is related to actions and 
that it grounds them. 
 
Indirect cognition can become cognition proper only if all members of the analogy 
can be presented also directly – so that one could determine if the analogy fits. This is 
possible in mathematics and in natural science, but impossible for such dissimilar 
things as sensible causality and supersensible freedom. Fortunately, practical 
philosophy does not require direct, full-fledged metaphysical determination of 
freedom. It suffices to present how freedom relates to actions: what freedom is for our 
practical reason. Through analogy “a concept [… is] sufficiently determined for us, 
through we have omitted everything that could have determined this concept […] in 
itself, for we determine the concept only with respect […] to us, and we have no need 
of more” (Prol, AA 04: 358). 
 
There are two aspects to this “need”. First, symbolism is necessary, for if we could 
not present our power of choice to ourselves as a kind of free causal power, we could 
not cognise ourselves as rational agents, capable not only of theoretically thinking the 
moral law but also of practically acting from it. The unschematised concept of ground 
suffices only for a stale and empty thought of an ungrounded act, not for the symbolic 
presentation of a free will in us. Second, symbolic presentation also suffices for 
practical reason – which concerns what ought to be – by providing “practical 
determination of what the idea of [freedom] ought to be for us and for the purposive 
use of it” (KU, AA 05: 353). Thus analogical cognition of freedom through natural 
causes as its symbols and actions as its appearing effects in part facilitate its practical 
objective reality – and thereby makes it possible for us to act morally from the moral 
law, not just in accordance with it. 
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CONCLUSION	  
 
Freedom can be cognised symbolically as a capacity to produce actions through 
rational choices, analogous to the capacity of natural things to causally influence each 
other. This is neither to merely think freedom as an unschematised logical ground nor 
to directly cognise it as a schematised cause. That freedom is to actions as causes are 
to effects is not to say that freedom is causality. Although the ontological character of 
freedom must remain unknown, it is necessary for morality that we can present in 
ourselves such a capacity for self-legislation. If we could not cognise our capacity to 
influence our actions, then even if we were free, we would still remain mere passive 
spectators of our lives, incapable of using our freedom through self-conscious, 
deliberate, and autonomous moral action. Thus symbolic cognition is not just the only 
coherent solution to the riddle of supersensible causality in transcendental idealism 
but even a necessary condition of the possibility of our very agency itself. 
